Signals Inbox·July 17, 2026·Defense Tech

Is Helsing the new European Anduril?

Helsing is now Europe’s closest answer to Anduril, sharing 19 of 35 tracked capabilities, but Anduril still covers more weapon families and the two directly compete across only a quarter of the stack.

Q1How much do Anduril and Helsing overlap today?

Anduril and Helsing currently overlap across 54.3% of the defence capabilities we tracked. At this point, the comparison rests on much more than a few similar products.

As our Anduril–Helsing Capability Convergence Map shows, they share 19 capabilities out of the 35 held by at least one of them. These include central parts of the autonomous-defence stack: battle management, sensor fusion, autonomous mission planning, swarm control, edge AI, electronic warfare, long-range strike drones, autonomous combat aircraft and underwater surveillance.

The software overlap is especially strong. Anduril uses Lattice to connect sensors, coordinate autonomous systems and support battlefield decisions. Helsing is moving into much the same territory through Altra and its other AI products.

A shared capability does not always mean interchangeable products, though. Helsing’s Lura acoustic model and Anduril’s undersea surveillance systems both sit in maritime intelligence, but they tackle the job differently.

Anduril also has 11 capabilities with no clear Helsing equivalent in our dataset. Helsing has five that remain unique. The convergence is real, but there is still plenty separating them.

Anduril–Helsing capability convergence map

Q2How much of Helsing’s business now looks like Anduril?

Almost four-fifths of Helsing’s current capability stack also exists at Anduril. That is why the “European Anduril” label has become so common.

Helsing has 24 evidenced capabilities today, and 19 are also present at Anduril. That gives Helsing a 79.2% resemblance to Anduril.

The reverse comparison is lower. Anduril has 30 capabilities, of which 19 also exist at Helsing, so Anduril resembles Helsing across 63.3% of its stack.

The asymmetry becomes obvious when you read the convergence map in both directions. Most of Helsing’s activities now sit inside categories Anduril already covers, while Anduril still operates in several areas Helsing has not entered publicly.

Those Anduril-only areas include dedicated counter-drone interceptors, tactical VTOL reconnaissance drones, cruise missiles, fixed surveillance towers, deployable command infrastructure and solid rocket motors.

Helsing already looks a lot like Anduril. Anduril still has the wider perimeter.

Q3Is Helsing basically a smaller Anduril?

Partly. Helsing is smaller by capability count, but the bigger difference is where each company has concentrated.

Helsing covers 24 capabilities, compared with 30 for Anduril. Its stack is therefore 80% as broad as Anduril’s. Two years ago, that figure was only 20%.

That is a huge shift. Helsing now operates in long-range strike, underwater autonomy, ground robotics and autonomous combat aircraft, on top of its original strengths in AI and electronic warfare.

Its portfolio still has a different shape.

Helsing covers every software and artificial-intelligence capability in our taxonomy. It also has all four electronic-warfare capabilities, compared with three for Anduril. Its strongest areas are software-defined operations, European platform integration, electronic warfare and a selected group of autonomous platforms.

Anduril has built more complete product families. It covers every counter-UAS capability we tracked, all three strike-system capabilities and several areas Helsing has not entered, including propulsion, expeditionary command infrastructure and fixed-site surveillance.

“A more focused Anduril” is closer to the data than simply “a smaller Anduril.”

Q4Are Anduril and Helsing getting more similar?

Very clearly. Their capability overlap rose from 14.3% to 54.3% in two years.

The Anduril–Helsing Capability Convergence Map also shows when this stopped being a loose comparison. Two years ago, we found only three shared capabilities, all in electronic warfare.

One year ago, the number had jumped to 16. Helsing’s launch of Altra and HX-2 created new overlap in mission software, autonomy, strike systems and manufacturing. Its move into underwater systems then pulled the companies closer in the maritime domain.

Today, they share 19 capabilities. The latest additions came from autonomous combat aircraft, artillery integration and AI integration with ground vehicles.

The big leap happened between two years ago and one year ago. Since then, the overlap has kept rising, just much more slowly.

How the overlap changed over two years

Q5Is Anduril-Helsing convergence speeding up?

No. The companies are still moving closer, but the pace has slowed sharply over the last year.

The overlap score rose by 37.3 percentage points during the first year of the period. Over the latest 12 months, it gained only another 2.7 points.

Helsing still added five net capabilities during that time, including autonomous combat aircraft, ground robotics, tactical space reconnaissance and new land integrations.

Several additions did not create new overlap. Helsing’s autonomous electronic-attack aircraft, Gripen AI integration, RX-1 ground platform and KIRK space programme pushed it into areas where Anduril had no direct equivalent in our taxonomy.

Anduril kept adding capabilities too. Both portfolios are growing, and growth on both sides no longer guarantees a higher overlap score.

Q6Is Helsing becoming more like Anduril, or is Anduril moving toward Helsing?

Most of the convergence comes from Helsing moving into areas where Anduril already had products or programmes.

The first-mover column in our convergence map makes the direction fairly hard to miss. Anduril entered first in 16 of the 19 capabilities the companies now share. Helsing moved first in one, while two appeared at roughly the same time.

Mission software gives the clearest example. Anduril had already built Lattice around sensor fusion, command and control, mission planning, swarm coordination and third-party integration before Helsing introduced comparable Altra capabilities.

The same sequence appears in long-range strike drones, autonomous underwater vehicles, persistent undersea surveillance and autonomous combat aircraft. Anduril entered first, then Helsing followed with HX-2, SG-1, Lura and CA-1 Europa.

Artillery integration is the main exception. Helsing introduced Altra Indirect Fires before Anduril showed comparable fire-control integration through Lattice Mesh.

That does not mean Helsing copied Anduril. They are chasing many of the same military requirements. Still, the direction is hard to miss: Helsing enters Anduril’s earlier territory far more often than Anduril enters Helsing’s.

Q7What is making Anduril and Helsing more similar?

Helsing’s move from defence software into complete air, strike, land and maritime systems has driven most of the recent convergence.

Electronic warfare was the original meeting point. Both companies already worked on emitter classification, geolocation and adaptive jamming two years ago.

The next wave came from Altra and HX-2. Together, they moved Helsing into sensor fusion, battle management, mission planning, swarm control, edge AI, resilient networking and long-range loitering strike.

Underwater systems added another layer. SG-1 and Lura gave Helsing a position in autonomous underwater vehicles, persistent anti-submarine surveillance and distributed sensor constellations. Anduril had already entered these areas through Dive Technologies and later Seabed Sentry.

CA-1 Europa then created a much cleaner comparison in autonomous combat aircraft. Helsing’s artillery and ground-vehicle integrations added more overlap on land.

Capabilities driving the recent convergence

Q8Is Helsing actually catching up with Anduril?

Yes. Helsing has closed a large part of the capability gap over the last two years, even while Anduril kept expanding.

Two years ago, Anduril had 20 evidenced capabilities and Helsing had four. The gap was 16.

One year ago, it had fallen to nine. Today, Anduril has 30 capabilities and Helsing has 24, leaving a difference of six. Helsing has therefore closed 62.5% of the original gap.

Anduril was growing at the same time. It added capabilities in manufacturing, undersea warfare, artillery integration and ground autonomy.

Across the full period, Helsing added 20 capabilities and Anduril added seven. Helsing expanded inside its original areas and moved into new families such as maritime systems, ground robotics, manufacturing and space.

The remaining difference is bigger than six capabilities makes it sound. Anduril has 11 unique areas and Helsing has five, and several of Anduril’s are already full product families rather than small extensions.

Q9Do Anduril and Helsing actually compete with each other?

Yes, but much less directly than the 54.3% overlap figure suggests. Strict direct competition covers only 25.7% of the combined stack.

That stricter score only counts areas where both companies could realistically address the same customer need or show up in the same procurement process.

The group includes battle management software, mission autonomy, electronic warfare, long-range strike drones and autonomous combat aircraft.

A broader definition that includes partial competition raises the score to 48.6%. This catches areas where the companies solve a similar problem but use different product formats, architectures, maturity levels or routes to market.

Maritime systems show the difference well. Both offer autonomous underwater systems and persistent surveillance, but Anduril’s Dive platforms, Seabed Sentry and Copperhead do not map neatly onto Helsing’s SG-1 gliders and Lura acoustic model.

Manufacturing is another example. Anduril’s Arsenal and Helsing’s Resilience Factories express similar ambitions, but a defence ministry would not normally choose between them as competing products.

The two companies are converging faster as strategic models than as substitutes in an actual procurement.

Q10Where do Anduril and Helsing compete most directly?

The clearest competition currently sits in mission software, electronic warfare and a small number of autonomous air and strike systems.

Mission software is the biggest direct battleground. Both companies cover all six software capabilities in our taxonomy. Four already qualify as direct competitive overlaps: sensor fusion, battle management, autonomous mission planning and collaborative autonomy.

Electronic warfare is just as real. Both classify emitters, locate threats and generate adaptive electromagnetic effects. Three of the four capabilities we tracked are shared and directly competitive.

The air and strike overlap is smaller but strategically important. HX-2 competes with Anduril’s long-range loitering weapons, while CA-1 Europa creates a clear comparison with Fury in autonomous combat aircraft.

Maritime overlap is wider than the direct competition score suggests. Both companies operate in three of the five maritime capabilities, but their systems still differ enough in architecture and operating concept to limit direct substitution.

Counter-UAS is where Anduril stands alone most clearly. It covers all four capabilities we tracked, while Helsing has no publicly evidenced dedicated counter-drone family.

Where Anduril and Helsing compete most directly

Q11Is the Anduril-Helsing overlap spread across the whole defence stack?

Across most of it, yes. The companies now overlap in mission software, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, air systems, strike systems, land systems, maritime systems and manufacturing.

This is no longer a comparison built around one similar drone or one AI product. The overlap runs from battlefield software down to physical autonomous platforms and the factories meant to produce them.

Some families still contribute far more than others. Mission software accounts for six shared capabilities. Electronic warfare adds three, and maritime systems another three. Together, those areas represent 12 of the 19 shared capabilities.

The weighted overlap score reaches 57.9%, slightly above the unweighted 54.3%. Their shared capabilities tend to sit in important areas such as command software, autonomy and electronic warfare.

Once evidence quality is included, the score falls to 47.3%. Several capabilities exist at both companies, but the public proof is stronger on one side. One may have an operational deployment while the other has only announced or demonstrated a product.

So yes, the overlap is broad. The mature, head-to-head competition is still concentrated in fewer places.

Q12Where are Anduril and Helsing still clearly different?

They differ most in complete weapon families, European platform integration and the industrial layers each company wants to control.

Anduril’s biggest unique area is counter-UAS. It has dedicated products for detection, autonomous classification, drone-on-drone interception, reusable counter-air interception and electronic defeat. Helsing has relevant AI and electronic-warfare technology, but no comparable dedicated counter-drone family appears in the public evidence we reviewed.

Anduril also stands alone in tactical VTOL reconnaissance, man-portable loitering weapons, cruise missiles, fixed-site surveillance, undersea effects, deployable edge infrastructure and solid rocket motor production.

Some of these gaps may last. Anduril’s move into rocket motors and expeditionary command infrastructure shows a broader appetite for controlling hardware and industrial layers that Helsing has not publicly prioritised.

Helsing has fewer unique areas, but they say a lot about its European strategy.

Its AI has been integrated into a crewed Saab Gripen fighter. Lura gives Helsing a dedicated large acoustic model for classifying submarines and vessels. Helsing has also introduced an autonomous electronic-attack aircraft and moved into tactical space reconnaissance through its KIRK joint venture with OHB.

That fits Helsing’s close relationships with European defence primes and national platforms. It can add AI and autonomy to aircraft, artillery, ground vehicles and sensors that European militaries already use.

Anduril owns the broader set of unique capabilities. Helsing’s distinctive strengths are tied more closely to European integration and sovereign defence programmes.

Q13Is Helsing really the European Anduril?

Yes, with a fairly big caveat. Helsing is now Europe’s closest structural equivalent to Anduril, but it has not reproduced the whole Anduril model.

The comparison works because both companies want to own the AI and mission-software layer, build proprietary autonomous platforms, produce lower-cost systems at scale and connect their technology with third-party equipment.

The numbers in our capability convergence map back that up. The companies overlap across 54.3% of the tracked capability union. Almost 80% of Helsing’s current capabilities are also present at Anduril, and Helsing has closed 62.5% of the breadth gap that existed two years ago.

Anduril still has six more evidenced capabilities overall and 11 areas with no current Helsing equivalent. Its lead is especially clear in counter-UAS, strike weapons, deployable infrastructure, fixed surveillance and propulsion.

The broad similarity also overstates how often they truly compete. Strict competitive collision covers only 25.7% of the combined stack.

Helsing’s route is shaped by Europe’s existing defence industry. Its work with Saab, Airbus, ARX, OHB and other European players makes it more integration-heavy. Helsing can supply AI, autonomy and mission software while leaning on platforms and supply chains already embedded in European armed forces.

Our conclusion today is simple: Helsing is the European Anduril, but a more focused and more European one. Anduril remains broader and more vertically integrated. Helsing is catching up fast through a tighter portfolio and a stronger position inside Europe’s existing defence ecosystem.