Signals Inbox·July 19, 2026·Defense Tech

Is Helsing really worth $18B today?

Helsing’s $18 billion valuation is aggressive but credible: investors are paying for Europe’s most promising software-led defense prime before its financial performance has fully caught up.

Q1Why did Helsing suddenly jump to an $18B valuation?

Helsing’s latest valuation is one of the boldest bets ever made on a European defense company. On July 13, the company announced a $1.8 billion Series E that valued it at $18 billion. Dragoneer, Lightspeed, Iconiq, Goldman Sachs Alternatives, JPMorganChase, CPP Investments, General Catalyst, Plural and StepStone participated.

The company says demand for the round exceeded the shares available. That helps explain the price, but the speed of the increase is more revealing. Helsing was reportedly worth a little over €1.7 billion after its Series B in September 2023, around €5 billion in July 2024 and €12 billion in June 2025.

Its valuation increased roughly tenfold in less than three years. Over the same period, Helsing changed from a defense-software startup into a company building strike drones, underwater vehicles, factories and an autonomous combat aircraft. Investors now see a potential European defense prime, not another software supplier.

Helsing’s funding and valuation history

Q2How did Helsing reach $18B in only five years?

Helsing reached an $18 billion valuation about five years after it was founded. Even within the current defense-tech boom, that is exceptionally fast.

Anduril was founded in 2017 and needed roughly nine years to reach its latest $61 billion valuation. Shield AI and Quantum Systems were both founded in 2015. They are currently worth $12.7 billion and approximately $8 billion respectively, despite having operated for around twice as long as Helsing.

Helsing was already worth more than €1.7 billion after about two years, €5 billion after three and €12 billion after four. Investors repeatedly increased the price without waiting for several years of audited group revenue.

The market around Helsing explains much of that urgency. European governments need autonomous weapons, deployments in Ukraine provide unusually fast product feedback, and institutional investors now treat defense technology as a major venture category. Those conditions explain the demand for shares more easily than they prove the company is already worth $18 billion.

Q3How much revenue is Helsing actually making now?

We cannot verify Helsing’s current group revenue from published accounts. The most recent number is a management forecast of €441 million, or approximately $502 million, for 2026.

The Financial Times reviewed the fundraising documents containing that forecast, and Helsing’s finance team said the main contracts supporting it had already been secured. That is meaningful evidence, but it remains a forecast prepared during a financing process.

The latest audited filing covers only Helsing GmbH, the main German legal entity. It reported €26.9 million of revenue in 2024, up from €9.6 million in 2023. Revenue grew 180%, although the entity recorded an €8 million operating loss. Its €3.7 million net profit came largely from €12.2 million of interest income generated by the company’s cash balance.

The same filing expected Helsing GmbH to generate €27 million to €30 million in 2025. That cannot be compared directly with the €441 million group forecast because the reporting scopes differ. Helsing operates through several subsidiaries, has bought Grob Aircraft and has expanded heavily into hardware.

So there is a real gap in the valuation debate. The audited historical number is reliable but incomplete, while the much larger current number is comprehensive but unaudited.

Q4Is Helsing’s 32x revenue multiple too high?

Yes. A 32x forward-revenue multiple is extremely high for a company manufacturing physical defense systems. Helsing can defend it only by growing at exceptional speed while keeping software central to the business.

A post-money valuation of $18 billion after raising $1.8 billion implies a pre-money value of $16.2 billion. Dividing that by the projected $502 million of 2026 revenue gives a 32.3x pre-money multiple. Using the complete post-money value produces 35.9x revenue.

We use the pre-money number when comparing financing rounds because the new cash was not part of Helsing before investors transferred it. The post-money figure shows what the entire company is worth immediately after the transaction.

A multiple above 30x can work for software with high gross margins, recurring revenue and limited capital expenditure. Helsing now builds drones, operates factories, owns an aircraft manufacturer and develops underwater vehicles. That means materials, inventory, testing facilities, production workers and plenty of working capital.

The valuation assumes Helsing’s software will remain valuable enough to outweigh the heavier economics of manufacturing weapons. That is the bet.

Q5Why is Helsing worth more per dollar of revenue than Anduril?

Helsing receives a much richer valuation than Anduril, Shield AI or Quantum Systems for each dollar of expected revenue. The financial evidence does not yet justify the full premium.

Fundraising documents reviewed by the Financial Times placed Helsing at 32x forward revenue before the new capital. The equivalent figures were 21x for Shield AI, 13x for Anduril and 8.5x for Quantum Systems.

Helsing’s multiple is therefore roughly 52% higher than Shield AI’s, 146% higher than Anduril’s and 276% higher than Quantum Systems’.

Anduril has generated $2.2 billion of annual revenue and spent several years converting development programs into large-scale production. Shield AI recently won a major role supplying autonomy software to the US Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program. Quantum Systems expects around €700 million of 2026 revenue, considerably more than Helsing’s forecast.

Helsing’s advantage is scarcity. It may be the only European company combining advanced autonomy software, strike drones, fighter-aircraft AI, underwater systems and sovereign manufacturing at this scale. Investors are paying heavily for that position before Helsing has clearly outperformed its closest peers financially.

Helsing’s forward-revenue premium over private defense-tech peers

Q6Is Helsing being priced like Palantir before earning Palantir’s numbers?

Pretty much. Palantir shows that Helsing’s multiple is possible, but it also shows how much financial proof Helsing is missing.

Palantir currently trades at approximately 44.5x its latest full-year revenue guidance, above Helsing’s post-money multiple. But Palantir reported $1.63 billion of revenue in its latest quarter, with growth of 85%. It produced a 60% adjusted operating margin, a 57% adjusted free-cash-flow margin and held $8 billion in cash and short-term US Treasuries.

Palantir now expects between $7.65 billion and $7.66 billion of annual revenue. Its projected revenue base is more than fifteen times Helsing’s, yet it continues to grow at a pace normally associated with much smaller companies.

Helsing shares the strategic-scarcity story. It has not shown comparable margins, consolidated cash generation or recurring software economics. Palantir supports the idea that investors will pay more than 40x revenue for an exceptional defense-software platform. It also sets a standard Helsing is nowhere near yet.

Q7How does Helsing compare with public defense companies today?

Helsing is priced far above listed defense companies, including businesses growing quickly in drones, autonomous systems and military software.

At the latest market close, AeroVironment was worth approximately $7.1 billion. It reported $1.98 billion of fiscal-year revenue, giving it a market-cap-to-revenue ratio of about 3.6x. Revenue increased 141%, partly because of the BlueHalo acquisition, and funded backlog reached $1.2 billion.

Kratos was worth approximately $8.3 billion and expects between $1.70 billion and $1.76 billion of revenue, producing a forward ratio close to 4.8x. Its latest quarterly revenue grew 23%, including 31% growth in unmanned systems.

Rheinmetall was worth around €45 billion and expects €14 billion to €14.5 billion of current-year sales. Its forward ratio is close to 3.2x, despite 29% revenue growth in the previous year, an 18.5% operating margin and a €63.8 billion backlog.

The comparisons use market capitalization rather than enterprise value, so they are approximate. The gap is too large to explain away, though. Helsing is priced around seven to eleven times more richly than fast-growing listed defense manufacturers. Investors expect software-platform economics, not normal weapons-company economics.

Helsing compared with public defense and software companies

Q8Is Helsing still growing unusually fast today?

Yes, particularly in physical production. The problem is that Helsing has not published consistent group data allowing us to calculate a clean revenue growth rate.

The German entity’s revenue increased 180% in 2024, while its team grew from 81 employees to 127. The wider Helsing group now has more than 400 employees, according to recent company reporting. That remains a small organization for the number of systems it is trying to build.

Its production expansion is easier to see. Helsing first announced an order for 4,000 HF-1 strike drones for Ukraine, followed by 6,000 HX-2 systems. It now says it delivers several hundred HX-2 drones per month.

The first German Resilience Factory was completed with initial capacity exceeding 1,000 HX-2 units per month. Helsing has since announced a West Virginia factory designed to produce more than 2,000 units monthly once fully operational. It is scaling the industrial base before the public financial reporting has caught up.

Q9Are Helsing’s contracts large enough to support $18B?

Helsing is winning contracts large enough to build a serious defense company. The firm amounts disclosed so far do not support an $18 billion valuation by themselves.

Germany approved an initial contract of approximately €269 million for 4,300 HX-2 strike drones. Dividing the full award by the number of systems gives roughly €62,600 per drone, although that should not be treated as a clean selling price. The contract may include software, support, integration and other services.

Earlier procurement documents allowed Helsing’s HX-2 framework to reach €1.46 billion. German lawmakers later capped spending at €1 billion per manufacturer unless further approval is granted. That ceiling is potential business, not committed revenue.

Fundraising documents also described an AI combat-cloud contract worth roughly €223 million. Helsing has disclosed fewer details about the customer, delivery schedule and revenue recognition for that program.

Helsing can now win programs worth hundreds of millions of euros. To reach several billion in annual revenue, it needs comparable awards across Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and other NATO markets.

Helsing’s disclosed contracts and programs

Q10Is Helsing still a software company?

Helsing now looks like a software-led weapons company. That distinction is central to the valuation, because a 30x revenue multiple becomes much harder to defend when physical manufacturing dominates sales.

The company originally focused on AI that could process sensor information and improve military decision-making. It now sells Altra for coordinating reconnaissance and strikes, Centaur for autonomous air combat and Cirra for electronic warfare.

Those products increasingly sit inside Helsing’s own hardware. HX-2 is a strike drone, SG-1 is an underwater glider, and CA-1 is a planned autonomous combat aircraft. Helsing also bought Grob Aircraft, an established manufacturer with around 275 employees, to acquire aircraft-design and production capabilities.

Owning the hardware gives Helsing control. Its engineers can update the software, sensors and platform together rather than waiting for a traditional contractor. Helsing also captures more of each program’s revenue.

But factories, components, quality control, maintenance and working capital are expensive. If physical systems eventually generate most of the revenue, Helsing will struggle to maintain the economics implied by its valuation. Its software needs to remain the reusable, high-margin layer running across the platforms.

Q11What can Helsing do that competitors cannot easily copy?

Helsing’s strongest advantage is the connection between its AI, military integrations, operational data and physical systems. None of the individual products is impossible to copy. Recreating the complete position would be much harder.

Centaur has controlled a production Saab Gripen E during live flights over the Baltic Sea. A human safety pilot remained in the cockpit, but Centaur took control of the aircraft and conducted combat manoeuvres against another Gripen in a beyond-visual-range scenario. Saab and Helsing moved from the beginning of integration to live flights in under six months.

Helsing is also working with Systematic to integrate its autonomous systems into SitaWare, a command-and-control suite used by more than 50 countries. Existing military customers could add Helsing systems without replacing the software through which they already manage operations.

Then there is the feedback loop. Data from Ukraine, military exercises and live aircraft tests can return to the same software teams building future releases. Traditional contractors often split aircraft, sensors, software and command systems between several suppliers.

Anduril, Shield AI and established defense companies can develop comparable technology. Copying Helsing’s European position would still require government trust, certified integrations, operational data, manufacturing capacity and relationships with existing military-software providers.

The moat is credible but young. It becomes durable when customers start choosing Helsing software across several third-party platforms, not only systems Helsing manufactures itself.

Q12Is Europe’s defense boom big enough to support an $18B Helsing?

Easily. Europe has enough defense spending to support a much larger Helsing. Customer access and execution are the constraints, not the size of the market.

The European Defence Agency reported that EU defense spending increased from €343 billion in 2024 to €418 billion in 2025 and is expected to reach €454 billion in 2026. That is 32% growth in two years, or roughly 15% annually.

Equipment procurement alone reached €115 billion in 2025. Defense investment represented more than 32% of spending, showing that governments are buying new capabilities rather than sending every additional euro toward salaries and existing operations.

The EU has also created the €150 billion SAFE loan program for common procurement. Its Readiness 2030 plan prioritizes drones, counter-drone systems, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare and maritime surveillance. Helsing operates in every one of those areas.

A company generating €1.2 billion of annual revenue would capture only around 0.26% of projected EU defense expenditure. Even €3 billion would be less than 0.7%.

The money is there. Winning enough programs without becoming trapped in slow and political procurement processes is the harder part.

Q13Is Helsing too dependent on Germany right now?

Yes. Germany currently provides too much of Helsing’s revenue visibility for the company to be considered a diversified global defense supplier.

The Financial Times reported that most orders supporting Helsing’s revenue forecast came from Germany. That fits its disclosed programs, including the initial HX-2 order and the large combat-cloud contract discussed during fundraising.

Germany is an excellent home market. It has the budget, strategic urgency and political interest required to support a domestic autonomous-defense champion. One large customer can help Helsing move much faster than a startup chasing dozens of small contracts.

The concentration becomes dangerous when a handful of German decisions determines a large share of expected growth. Procurement delays, budget negotiations or a decision to divide orders among several suppliers could change Helsing’s outlook quickly.

Helsing is expanding. It has opened an underwater-systems factory in Plymouth, formed partnerships in Sweden, deployed systems in Ukraine and announced its first US manufacturing site. But a factory does not create customer diversification. American orders do.

Germany gives Helsing scale and credibility today. It also leaves the company exposed to one national procurement system.

Q14Do the HX-2 performance problems weaken Helsing’s valuation?

Yes, because investors are already pricing Helsing as a technical leader. The evidence does not show that HX-2 is a failed product, but repeatable battlefield performance remains publicly unproven.

German reporting cited one Ukrainian evaluation with five successful engagements across fourteen attempts, a hit rate of about 36%. Other reports described technical problems and uncertainty around follow-on orders.

Helsing disputed that account. The company said more than six Ukrainian units had made concrete requests for HX-2 systems and that the unit involved in frontline testing requested more than 1,000 additional drones. It also said HX-2 had entered Ukraine’s central ordering system and was being delivered at several hundred units per month.

A later US Army exercise produced a much stronger result. Soldiers launched 17 HX-2 drones during Project Flytrap in Lithuania, recording 15 hits and two near misses. Encouraging, yes. But a planned exercise cannot reproduce months of electronic warfare, poor weather, field maintenance and changing enemy tactics.

The picture is messy: a product improving quickly, with real demand, but still surrounded by conflicting performance claims. Repeat orders from units using HX-2 in combat would tell us far more than either company statements or short demonstrations.

Q15How much revenue would Helsing need to justify $18B?

Helsing probably needs at least $1.2 billion to $1.8 billion of annual revenue before the valuation begins to look comfortable at more normal defense-tech multiples.

The current fundraising forecast gives us a base of approximately $502 million. Helsing would need $600 million of annual revenue to support $18 billion at 30x sales. At 20x, it needs $900 million. At 15x, it needs $1.2 billion, while a 10x multiple requires $1.8 billion.

The growth gets demanding near the bottom of that range. Reaching $1.2 billion by 2029 would require annual growth of about 34%. Reaching $1.8 billion would require approximately 53% growth every year.

A 30x multiple might survive while Helsing continues winning major programs. It is less plausible for a mature company manufacturing drones, aircraft and underwater vehicles. The real test is whether Helsing can grow into at least $1.2 billion to $1.8 billion of revenue before investors start pricing it more like other defense companies.

Revenue Helsing needs to support an $18B valuation

Q16What would make Helsing worth more than $18B?

Helsing becomes worth more than $18 billion when HX-2 starts looking like the first product in a repeatable international platform rather than one large German procurement cycle.

The first requirement is demand outside Germany. We would want two or three additional NATO governments placing meaningful production orders after testing the systems themselves. A large US contract would change the valuation case more than another factory announcement.

The second requirement is independent software revenue. Altra, Centaur and Helsing’s electronic-warfare products need to run across third-party aircraft, drones and command systems. Customers must value the software even when Helsing does not manufacture the platform underneath it.

Then comes scale. Revenue above $1.2 billion makes the valuation easier to defend at 15x sales. Revenue approaching $2 billion, with growth continuing, could support a value comfortably above $18 billion.

Margins decide whether Helsing deserves an ordinary defense multiple or something closer to Palantir. A blended gross margin above roughly 40% would be strong evidence that software remains central. Below 30%, sustaining a 15x to 20x revenue multiple becomes difficult.

CA-1 and SG-1 could add another leg of value, but technical milestones only go so far. A flight test proves progress. A funded production contract proves someone will pay for it.

Q17What could cut Helsing’s valuation in half?

Helsing does not need to collapse for its valuation to fall from $18 billion to around $9 billion. It only needs slower growth and a more ordinary defense-tech multiple.

Suppose annual revenue reaches $700 million and investors apply a 12x multiple. Helsing would be worth $8.4 billion. That still describes a large, fast-growing defense company, just not an exceptional software platform.

Germany might stop after the initial HX-2 purchases rather than using the full framework. Other countries could test Helsing products without ordering them at scale. Hardware might become a larger share of sales, pushing margins toward AeroVironment or Rheinmetall levels.

Technical delays would hurt too. CA-1 could consume substantial capital before generating revenue, while underwater systems and robotics compete for engineering resources. Weak field performance would make it harder to charge a premium over cheaper drone suppliers.

Customer concentration can make these problems arrive together. A company dependent on a few government programs can move from explosive growth to a quiet year when one procurement decision slips.

There is very little room for that pause in today’s price. Helsing’s valuation could fall sharply simply because it became a good defense manufacturer rather than the great defense-software platform investors paid for.

Q18So is Helsing really worth $18B today?

Not on proven financial performance alone. But $18 billion is a credible price for what Helsing could become, which is why we would call the valuation aggressive rather than absurd.

The bearish case is straightforward. Helsing trades above 30x forecast revenue, receives a much higher multiple than Anduril, Shield AI or Quantum Systems and has not published consolidated accounts supporting its current revenue forecast. Germany appears to underpin much of the immediate order base, while Helsing’s expansion into hardware creates costs that pure software companies avoid.

The bullish evidence is real. Helsing has won production contracts worth hundreds of millions of euros, moved thousands of systems toward operational use, integrated its AI into a live Gripen fighter and built factories in Germany, Britain and the United States. It operates directly inside the autonomous systems, electronic warfare and drone categories receiving the fastest growth in European defense spending.

For $18 billion to make sense, Helsing needs to exceed $1 billion of revenue within a few years, win large orders outside Germany, demonstrate repeat battlefield demand and keep margins well above those of ordinary weapons manufacturers.

The company has a believable route to those results. Investors have already paid for most of the journey, though. Today’s Helsing does not fully justify $18 billion; the future Helsing might.